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ABSTRACT
The literature suggests that neighborhoods with organized criminal networks
would have lower crime rates than other neighborhoods or communities, because of the
social control their organization exerts on residents and visitors. The strictly organized
Italian-American Mafia seems to have characteristics that would translate throughout the
neighborhood: People will not participate in overt illegal behaviors because they do not
know who is watching, and the fear of what the Mafia might do keeps residents and
visitors to the neighborhood relatively well-behaved. Using crime statistics from the
NYPD and census data for neighborhood characteristics, four linear regressions were
calculated. The results indicate that low socioeconomic status is the main factor
explaining neighborhood crime rate variations in New York City. The percent of the
population under 18 and density were also listed as influential factors for some variables.
The percent of foreign-born Italians was noted as significant in the correlation models,
though it is not yet clear what this might truly indicate. The proxy variable for Mafia
presence was not significant, and this can either be due to inaccuracies of the
measurement of the variable or a true decrease in the influence of Mafia presence after
the string of RICO arrests in the 1980s and 1990s. The results imply that Mafia presence
does not influence neighborhood social control, but they do reinforce social
disorganization theory. The foundation of this theory is neighborhood stability; the more
unstable a neighborhood is, the more susceptible the neighborhood is to crime and
dysfunction. Factors like low socioeconomic status and density influence neighborhood
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stability. Future research should attempt to have more accurate representations of Mafia
presence and neighborhood characteristics.
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INTRODUCTION

According to the Johnson commission (1964): “Organized crime is a society that
seeks to operate outside the control of the American people and their government. It
involves thousands of criminals, working within structures as complex as those of any
large corporation, subject to laws more rigidly enforced than those of legitimate
governments” (Jacobs, Panarella and Worthington, 1994, p.194). These organizations
can be considered anything from the grandiose Mafia families to the teen street, drugdealing gangs (Orvis and Rush, 2000). Organized crime comes in many forms, but for
the purpose of this paper, the focus will be on the Mafia, specifically Italian and ItalianAmerican groups also known as La Cosa Nostra.
Shaw and McKay (1969), Suttles (1972), Hunter (1985), Sampson (1985) and
Bursik and Grasmick (2001), among others, provide the framework for the argument that,
despite the massive illicit dealings of the Italian-American Mafia, the residential
neighborhoods in which they live and work remain relatively free of delinquency and
street crime, more so than other similar urban neighborhoods. The underlying premise is
straight-forward, everybody prefers to live in a safe neighborhood. This study will
examine the characteristics of the defended neighborhood and how they are uniquely
applied to New York City neighborhoods, particularly the Italian-American
neighborhood of Bensonhurst in Brooklyn. The expectation is that Bensonhurst and
other neighborhoods with a strong Mafia presence have significantly lower street crime
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than the rest of New York City due to the influence and informal social control exerted
by organized crime.
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CHAPTER 1: THE DEFENDED NEIGHBORHOOD

Suttles (1972) coined the term defended neighborhood to describe communities
where members collectively eradicate selected delinquency and crime from their
community. “The residential group which seals itself off through the efforts of
delinquent gangs, by restrictive covenants, by sharp boundaries, or by a forbidding
reputation—what I will call the defended neighborhood—was for a time a major category
in sociological analysis” (Suttles, 1972, p. 21). These communities are able to exert
formal and informal social controls on community residents, on outsiders to the
neighborhood, or on both. The literature makes clear that four elements are necessary to
become a successful defended neighborhood: fear, reputation, organization
(disorganization), and social control. The following sections will present an overview of
these elements of defended neighborhoods.

Fear and Reputation
Personal views of a neighborhood vary; for some it might be the two block radius
from their home, for others it might be the whole area between their job and their home,
and for others their “neighborhood” is simply the street on which they live. However,
there are typically general areas defined by the public and adopted by residents that are
considered “neighborhoods.” In several larger cities, including New York City and
Chicago, these neighborhoods have official status and have been widely used by planning
agencies and other municipal offices, in some cases for over a century.
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Suttles (1972) writes, “The Neighborhood,’…has a more fixed referent and
usually possesses a name and some sort of reputation known to persons other than the
residents” (p.37). This public reputation of a neighborhood is often its most important
asset, and it is the responsibility of neighborhood residents to define and maintain this
reputation. If neighborhood residents desire safe streets, it is they who have to do the
work and make the effort to keep their streets safe. This ranges from physically stopping
the crime to gaining influence with the police department and other local officials to help
in crime reduction and prevention. Whatever the means of the neighborhood, residents
being involved is the key to a successful defense.
For residents to become actively involved in securing their neighborhood, there
first has to be an element of fear. This could stem from inside or outside the
neighborhood; but there has to be a feeling of imminent danger or “urban unease” on
some level for people to take up the cause of their neighborhood (Boggs, 1971; Taylor
and Hale, 1986; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Liska and Baccaglini, 1990). Conversely,
as citizens come together to defend their community, they must create a reputation of fear
for the rest of the city; find a successful way to advertise their defenses, letting others
know that if they mess with the neighborhood, there will be negative consequences
(Suttles, 1972). 1 This can be done through the social networks they create through the
organization of the neighborhood.

1

Most larger cities have one or more neighborhoods with a reputation for applying negative sanctions to
street crime, for example, Little Italy and Hampden in Baltimore, The Hill in St. Louis and Bensonhurst in
New York City.
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Organization
Shaw and McKay (1969) created the theory of social disorganization as a way to
explain why some neighborhoods experienced different levels of street crime and
deterioration. Social disorganization theory explains that the more organized the
residents are in neighborhoods, the more social control the neighborhood experiences and
therefore the lower the level of delinquency or street crime in the neighborhood (Shaw
and McKay, 1969; Suttles, 1972; Kornhauser, 1979; DeSena 1994). In other words, the
denser the social networks in a given community, the better it can fight against overt and
excessive street crime, delinquency, and neighborhood deterioration (Krohn 1986;
DeSena 1994). There is the longstanding argument that socioeconomic status affects the
level of community stability (Whyte 1941; Shaw and McKay 1969; Kornhauser, 1979;
Sampson and Groves, 1989). However, Whyte (1941), Suttles(1972) and Kornhauser
(1979) discuss the fact that those with low socioeconomic status and high rates of
delinquency do not necessarily suffer from lack of organization. Whyte (1941) discusses
the “Millers” and their highly organized order of operations, despite their low
socioeconomic status (655). He notes specifically the hierarchy of the “Millers” and how
the leaders could very easily get the members of their group to follow what they wanted
to do. The chain of command makes accomplishing tasks easier and more organized
(Whyte 1941). The neighborhoods that succeed in maintaining relatively “safe” streets,
regardless of socioeconomic status, have been described by many as defended
neighborhoods.
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Social Control (or Networks)
Personal control is among families and friends; those who are closest to each
other have a stronger effect on monitoring and maintaining desired behavior (Hunter,
1985; Bursik and Grasmick, 2001). “Within such groups, social control is usually
achieved through the allocation or threatened withdrawal of sentiment, social support,
and mutual esteem (p.233).” (Bursik and Grasmick 2001:16). Hirschi (1969),
Kornhauser (1978) and Crutchfield et al (1982) describe family composition as an
important factor in organizing and stabilizing a community. Sampson (1985) writes, “It
is suggested that areas with pronounced family disorganization are less able to provide an
effective network of social controls. In contrast, communities with a strong familial base
are likely to be areas where families know each other and provide mutual support” (p.
11). Family composition appears to be a key factor in the defended neighborhood.
Parochial control refers to the control that comes from schools, churches and other more
formal institutions that expect certain behaviors from participants. Bursik and Grasmick
(2001).clarified that “…the parochial order refers to relationships among neighbors who
do not have the same sentimental attachment” (2001:17). Finally public control comes
from the police department and other government agencies. “The second, and perhaps
most important, external resource concerning the control of crime concerns the
relationships that exist between the neighborhood and the police department of the city in
which it is located” (Bursik and Grasmick 2001 P. 17). A defended neighborhood is at its
strongest if all three of these aspects of control are maintained. Neighborhoods that have
strong family composition, solid public schools and a decent amount of local tax money
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to support their police department have a stronger defense against delinquency and street
crime than those neighborhoods with none or only one of the three P’s of social control
discussed by Hunter (1985). “Hence, the greater density of networks among persons in a
community, the greater the constraint on deviant behavior within the purview of the
social network” (Krohn 1986, p. 84). The more connected a neighborhood is through
social networks, the more social control that neighborhood will have. The more
influence a community has in all areas, Personal, Parochial and Public control, the
greater the chances are of successful defense against street crime and delinquency.

Socioeconomics
There are no consistent socioeconomic characteristics of a defended neighborhood. Shaw
and McKay([1942]1969) focused on the socioeconomic aspect of social organization as
did Suttles (1972) and Kornhauser(1979), but in the latter works it becomes clear that
SES may not be a very good predictor of how well a neighborhood is defended. Those
that have more money can afford more Public control and probably more Parochial
control, but neighborhoods with any level of SES can achieve familial or Personal
control. There are accounts of lower-class neighborhoods being defended by women and
street gangs, but this is rare among those who are less economically endowed (Shaw and
Mckay [1942] 1969; Suttles 1972; Patillo 1998 ). In either case, a part of creating
neighborhood safety involves citizens organized in some type of social network willing to
actively work toward eradicating the presence of street crime in their neighborhood
(Suttles 1972; Kornhauser 1979; Krohn 1986; McIllwain 1999).
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“In a very real sense, many of our slum communities in large cities come to
approximate warrior societies because they must perform so much of their own policing
and other functions which are ostensibly the responsibility of public institutions” (Suttles,
1972, p.191). Those of lower SES are many times more tightly networked than those
who have more of an economic advantage, and they will personally fight for the
neighborhood; taking up where the government leaves off. “Thus in these defended
communities, a significant amount of delinquency did not represent internal social
disorganization but organized responses to perceived external threats”(Heitgard and
Bursik, 1987, p. 785). Moreover, if a slum neighborhood has a reputation for violence or
other street crime, it lowers the likelihood that outsiders will enter their territory;
delinquency in one’s own neighborhood can be a deterrent.
Neighborhoods with a higher SES may be able to afford the outside Public and
Parochial control but they might not have strong Personal networks. “The segmental
character of urban life leaves only some people free some of the time to invest their
energy and interests into the defended neighborhood” (Suttles, 1972, p. 37). Most often
the best defended neighborhoods are middle to upper class because they can better afford
to have the political and social connections to enforce rules about street behavior.
Women of wealthier families can stay home and keep a look out in the neighborhood
(Desena 1994). DeSena (1994) discusses the neighborhood of Greenpoint in Brooklyn,
New York. The women of this neighborhood keep very close tabs on all of the social
action and closely monitor who they allow into the neighborhood by tightly controlling
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the rental and sale of property. They have established a tight social network and use this
network to aid in protecting the neighborhood (DeSena, 1994).
Basically, high socioeconomic status can help, but it is not the only indicator of a
defended neighborhood. The literature has pointed to several different indicators of the
defended neighborhood, but what if all of those indicators were present at the same time?
For a neighborhood to have the best defense it must have the elements of fear,
reputation, social organization, and social control. At least some neighborhoods with a
heavy presence of the Italian-American Mafia seem to possess all of these characteristics.
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CHAPTER 2: LA COSA NOSTRA: THE FIVE FAMILIES OF NEW
YORK CITY’S ITALIAN-AMERICAN MAFIA

La Cosa Nostra or “this thing of ours” is the slang term for those involved in
Sicilian crime families known more widely as “the Mafia.”(Maas, 1999;Orvis and Rush,
2000; DeStefano, 2007). Beginning in the 19th century in Sicily as a way to protect
citizens from unstable and unfair government, the U.S. American Mafia is a collection of
Italian immigrants who opted for bootlegging and other black market dealings rather than
the janitorial and unpleasant jobs typically held by immigrants (Maas, 1999; DeStefano,
2007). These bootlegging organizations have strong roots in family and are intricately
organized (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Block and Chambliss, 1981;). Traditionally,
there is a strict code by which all members of the organization must live or they must
undergo, usually severe, punishment —the code is referred to as Omerta, meaning honor.
Living by the Omerta means that you never talk about the organization or sell out the
organization by giving away information (Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 2007). For the most
part the Omerta works; it was not until the 1980s that people began to work as informants
for the FBI, breaking the sacred code of honor (Jacobs et al., 1994).
The La Cosa Nostra grew fast in the United States during prohibition; there was
plenty of opportunity to make a lot of money with little risk, but most of their dealings
are far from upstanding(Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972;Block, 1980; Block and Chambliss
1981). The Mafia grows strong roots in society through extortion and bribery and for
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some time even the FBI denied its existence for fear of retaliation. Until the 1980s there
was no massive crack down on Mafia operations (Jacobs et al, 1994). Many believe that
the Mafia is no longer operating or that it never was in the first place; but if you read the
news it becomes obvious that that is not true, there are several recent articles that discuss
the many current operations of the Italian-American Mafia (AP 2007). Further, the Mafia
always has replacements ready when other members die or go to jail. The organization is
set up to keep renewing itself no matter what happens (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972;
Maas, 1999). The Italian-American Mafia has a strong organization and network that
enables them to withstand the many law enforcement and social challenges, below we
will see how these characteristics spill over into the neighborhoods in which they live.

Characteristics of the Defended Mafia Neighborhood
Italian-American Mafia neighborhoods possess all of the characteristics suggested for a
defended neighborhood: fear, reputation, organization, and social control. 2

The Fear
Fear is essentially the driving force for neighborhood organization and social control
(networks) and the La Cosa Nostra represents fear (Boggs, 1971; Skogan and Maxfield,
1981; Taylor and Hale, 1986; Liska and Baccaglini, 1990). It is common knowledge that
you will be killed if you do the wrong thing inside a neighborhood controlled by the
Mafia, this fear of immediate and permanent punishment deters residents and outside
street criminals from acting out. Suttles (1972), discusses Chicago’s Mafia, better known
2

It is important to note that not all cities have a branch of La Cosa Nostra. There is a general consensus
that the strongest Mafia families are found in New York City and Chicago.
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as the “Outfit,” and explains that “the Italian boys, as well as the Mexican, Puerto Rican,
and black ones, tended to behave rather gingerly when in the presence of their Italian
male elders. Rumor had it that many of the Italian males had ready access to professional
‘skullers’ and could carry out heavy handed retaliation against anyone who challenged
their authority or dignity” (Suttles, 1972, p.202). This is one of many examples where
the social network of the Mafia has stabilized its reputation for violence, rumors can have
a profound effect on the behavior of people in particular neighborhoods, although they
may not be completely based in reality.

The Reputation
The Italian-American Mafia has a notorious reputation for retaliating against
those who cross them by making them “disappear.” The Mafia have many personal and
political connections that it is easy for them to quietly end a person’s life. This idea is
reinforced by films like the Godfather, Goodfellas, Casino and even Dick Tracy.
Without even coming in contact with the Mafia, the general public already has a
preconceived idea about the Mafia based on media representation. This perception is
mildly accurate because the Mafia really is tightly organized and networked (Ianni and
Reuss-Ianni ,1972; McIllwain, 1999; DeStefano, 2007).
The network density of the Mafia is so strong that it extends far beyond adjacent
neighborhoods; all five New York City Boroughs are aware of the Mafia presence in
Bensonhurst and other sections of the city (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni ,1972; McIllwain,
1999; DeStefano, 2007). The Mafia not only put their roots in their neighborhoods, but
they tend to take over government business and local industry; garbage trucks,
12

construction, the garment district, and the waterfront in Manhattan. As the Mafia get
deeply involved with a city both financially and physically, more and more people
become an indirect part of “this thing of ours” (Block, 1980; Maas, 1999). “People who
understood power and ‘the way things were’ recognized the Mafia as a force in politics
vice and legitimate business including shipping, trucking, garbage disposal and the
garment district” (Jacobs et al, 1994). Members of the organization get elected to
government offices and take jobs in the police department to make things like bribery,
extortion and other crimes a bit easier, but it also allows for protection from the
government and the police department, which aids in the reduction of street crime
(DeStefano, 2007). The Mafia is rarely questioned or opposed by local law enforcement;
they achieve this usually through bribery (Jacobs et al, 1994). “Remarkably, until well
into the 1960s the FBI, under the leadership of J. Edgar Hoover, disputed the very
existence of an American Mafia” (Jacobs et al, 1994, p. 45). Finally the element of fear
that the Mafia carries elevates the neighborhood to an even higher defended status. Not
only do people in the neighborhood behave, people outside the neighborhood behave
according to the regulations set forth by the organization. "People fear the violence,
because it often spills over and hurts innocent bystanders. But at the same time, people
give the mob credit for occasionally mediating in community disputes and for enforcing a
certain set of rules on the street” (Dillon, 1992, p. 35). In neighborhoods defended by
street gangs, outsiders can see what they are up against, but in Mafia neighborhoods
everything is behind closed doors. The tall tales and the true stories that float around
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about the Mafia keep up this reputation even if they come or go in a neighborhood
(Suttles, 1972).

The Organization
The Mafia organized their families and their businesses under strict rules and
codes and because of their social networking skills, these rules and codes often spill over
into their neighborhoods. The strict code of rules applies to their families and
organization but also in the neighborhood they choose to live or work in (Ianni and
Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Block, 1980). Criminologist James Jacobs from NYU also believes
that the Mafia and other organized criminal activities can make a neighborhood safer
(DeStefano 2007). DeStefano held an interview with James Jacobs in New York City in
May, 2002. During the interview Jacobs said “Mafiosi were a force for stability in
neighborhoods…They wanted to live in safe neighborhoods, and because they had a
reputation for violence and a willingness to use violence, the neighborhoods in which
they had presence were safe” (DeStefano, 2007, p.60). The vast organization and social
network that the Mafia constructed is responsible for social control through its reputation,
both real and rumored, for retaliation.

The Social Control
Another important detail of the defended Mafia neighborhoods is the emphasis on
family values. Previously noted, family composition can be a significant predictor of
social disorganization, and is most likely a significant factor in the organization of the
Mafia and their neighborhoods (Sampson 1985; Sampson and Groves, 1989; McIllwain,
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1999). The Mafia home life builds this Personal control through emphasis on respect
and trust. Because heritage is one of the most important elements of La Cosa Nostra
(you cannot be considered for full membership if you are not Italian), more people
involved in the organization carry the same family and religious values (Ianni and ReussIanni, 1972; Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 2007). This makes it easier for the family values to
cross over into the neighborhood; it is not solely fear that drives the organization; strong
family values aid in creating a successfully defended neighborhood.
The neighborhoods that are home to the Mafia make trade offs with residents so
that their illegal business behind closed doors will not be of concern; providing safety for
residents is one of the benefits of looking the other way in the presence of their illegal
enterprise. The social network of the Mafia extends far beyond their tiny neighborhood.
“Network density refers to the extent to which all actors in a social network are
connected by direct relations. When network density is high, the ability to control
delinquency is increased because the behavior of participants in such a network is
potentially subject to the reactions of all network members” (Sampson and Groves, 1989,
p.779). Mcillwain (1999) discusses social networking as a new framework for
understanding organized crime; the criminal organizations are successful on the large
scale because they are so tightly networked. James Jacobs explains “So, the Mafia was
functional. That’s why it lasted so long, why it was so powerful, because it served
needs.”(DeStefano, 2007, p.61).
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CHAPTER 3: THE BENSONHURST NEIGHBORHOOD

The focus on the New York City neighborhood of Bensonhurst and the influence
of the Mafia presence in the neighborhood stems from approximately four years of
personal residence in the area. While I was looking for an apartment in Brooklyn, people
told me to pay attention to the cars parked on the street because this was considered an
indicator of neighborhood safety. On my street in Bensonhurst, people parked their
Jaguars without a second thought, the neighbors left their front doors unlocked, and
police cars were practically nonexistent. These things struck me as odd; it just did not
seem possible that, in New York City, a place that quickly trains you to keep tabs on all
personal belongings, people do not garage their Jaguars or lock their doors and there are
not police cars every two or three blocks. After spending enough time in Bensonhurst,
deli owners, old women on their front porch, men at the Laundromat started to talk, and I
began to realize that the Mafia also had a strong presence in the neighborhood. Joe, the
corner deli guy, told me that all of the deli ATM cash machines were owned by the Mafia
and that they would not allow him to have one in his deli. I may never know if what Joe
said was actually true, but I do know that this as not the first or last time I heard mention
of the Mafia in that neighborhood. During my stay in Bensonhurst, I always attributed
my safety to the presence of the Mafia.
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The elements to a successful defended neighborhood are fear, reputation
organization, social control or networks (including elements of the three P’s). The
neighborhoods of the Italian-American Mafia or La Cosa Nostra meet, and often excel, at
all four elements and therefore maintain the safest neighborhoods. Bensonhurst is a good
example of a Mafia neighborhood with the type of defense described in this paper.

Fear and Reputation
The Mafia in Bensonhurst are so tightly networked that it translates into the
neighborhood network. Everyone begins to share the Omerta; the rules of the Mafia
become the neighborhood rules and the vow of silence becomes the vow of the
neighborhood (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Block, 1980). “Perhaps the most subtle
structural feature of the defended neighborhood is its shared knowledge or what might be
called its underlife”(Suttles,1972, p. 36). Lori Geli, a 28 year old mother and resident
among the Brooklyn mob neighborhoods says "We don't like dead bodies, with holes in
their heads, turning up in front of our homes, but in a way the Mafia keeps the
neighborhood safe. There aren't half as many burglaries here as in other places. So their
presence is kind of good because they give a kind of fear to other people" (Dillon, 1992,
p.35). There is an exchange of respect and trust in Bensonhurst. “Trust is used here in
this third sense, as a social relationship in which principals—for whatever reason or state
of mind—invest resources, authority, or responsibility in another to act on their behalf for
some uncertain future return…”(Shapiro, 1987, p. 653).
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Organization and Social Control
Bensonhurst is the kind of neighborhood where kids sled in the streets in the winter and
play in the water from the fire hydrants in the summer. “In Bensonhurst everyone knows
everyone else on every block. Its mainly blue-collar residents are insular, closemouthed
and suspicious of outsiders. Strangers are remarked on at once. As a result, the rate of
common street crimes—rapes, robberies, felony assaults—is low compared to other parts
of the city, according to police statistics. Murder is a third less than the citywide
average” (Maas, 1999, p.2). The values and ideals upheld by La Cosa Nostra in
Bensonhurst have persisted over time and have penetrated the community. “Cultural
theory suggests that once beliefs, values, ideas and ideologies become norms in a macro
unit, they can persist over time and generations through the normal process of
socialization. To some extent, beliefs and fear of crime may also be part of the
socialization process” (Liska and Baccaglini, 1990, p. 361).
Residents of Bensonhurst are fully aware of the Mafia presence in their
neighborhood and the majority of those living there do not mind (Bohlen, 1989; Dillon,
1992). For them it is extra security; the same kind of security that the Mafia was initiated
for back in Sicily; protection for those who cannot protect themselves. Despite the vast
underworld of criminal activity, Bensonhurst was and is one of the safest neighborhoods
in all of New York City. The infamous “Five Families” of the American Italian Mafia
call Bensonhurst in south Brooklyn home. The Gambino, Columbo, Bonnano, Genovese,
and Luchese families operate throughout New York City, but are densely located in
South Brooklyn (Bohlen, 1989; Dillon, 1992; De Stefano, 2007). Occupying about two
18

square miles, the neighborhood of Bensonhurst is a relatively quiet suburban area.
(Bohlen, 1989). Howard Feur, district manager of the community board for Bensonhurst
says “It is not uncommon for people to have lived here all their lives, for their parents to
have lived here before them. These are people who are happy in their community…The
biggest problem’ is the subways, they don’t run on time” (Bohlen, 1989, p.A1). There is
the occasional elevated train that passes but mostly the noise and city chaos are off in the
distance. Almost entirely two family homes, the majority of front yards are adorned with
wrought iron gates and various religious statues (Bohlen, 1989; DeStefano 2007). This
neighborhood is extremely family oriented and knowing the neighbors is a must in this
area (Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, 1972; Maas, 1999; DeStefano, 2007).
The sense of family and community in Bensonhurst has persisted over time, and
has been described as unchanged since the 1950s. This could explain the ability of the
neighborhood to have such dense social networks and strong social control. The
neighborhood has had decades to develop and maintain its reputation of quiet streets but
underground fear. Bensonhurst has strong organization and social networks; the strong
reputation for violence creates fear and deters delinquency and street crime. Bensonhurst
is one of the most effective defended neighborhoods, because it is not missing any of the
necessary elements needed for a successfully defended neighborhood.
In order to conduct a more quantitative test of the hypothesis that Mafia
neighborhoods in New York City have lower levels of street crime than others with
similar socioeconomic characteristics, the next section of the paper analyzes assault,
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homicide and robbery rates for the New York City community districts circa 2000. As
will be discussed below, there is a difficulty in undertaking this type of analysis because
there is a lack of a reliable measure for Mafia presence or influence at any level. Because
the Mafia has been increasingly disrupted by informants during the past two decades,
their presence can begin to be approximated by using arrest records. However, even this
method is not an accurate measure of Mafia presence because it only assesses those
members who get caught, not all Mafia members. There are no membership lists or end
of the year financial records for New York City Mafia families, and this makes it difficult
to precisely measure Mafia presence.
Russian organized crime, typically referred to as the Russian Mafia, is another
predominant crime group in the United States and New York City (Shelley, 1995;
Finkenhauer and Waring, 1998). Russian organized crime is not considered to be as
organized as the Italian-American Mafia because they do not have any typical order of
operation and they have many small groups rather than one large group. However, the
impact of their many organizations has harmed many on a global scale as well as locally
in New York City (Shelley, 1995; Finckenhauer and Waring, 1998). Because Russian
organized crime is well-known in the United States and New York City, it will be used as
a measure of mafia presence in the final analysis. This will allow for a broader picture of
the effects of organized crime that is not specifically Italian.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS

The best way to study a neighborhood is through observation and
interview/survey, as we have seen through the work of Park and Burgess (1925), Suttles
(1972), DeSena (1994), Patillo (1998) and the like. However, there are three reasons why
this project will not use the preferred method. First, there are time constraints. Second,
due to the nature of the topic, there would probably be an overwhelming unwillingness to
talk by residents. Lastly, the Mafia has been depicted so frequently in movies and
television that there is a likelihood of exaggerated responses. Instead of interviewing
New York City residents, this part of the thesis will analyze secondary data collected by
government agencies.
Specifically, to take a closer look at the influence of Mafia presence on
neighborhood levels of crime, I turned to two data sources: the United States Census
Bureau and the New York City Police Department.

Independent Variables
Data from the Census Bureau were retrieved from the New York City Department
of City Planning for the year 2000 for each New York City community district. The
purpose of collecting these data is to show the neighborhood characteristics that are
commonly associated with neighborhood public safety. The reason community districts
were chosen rather than census tracts or neighborhoods are three fold. Because this study
is preliminary, first the larger community districts will be analyzed and, if the results
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warrant further investigation, a more detailed study of census tracts or neighborhoods
will be conducted. Additionally, it is important to consider that census tracts are much
smaller than neighborhoods and this may misrepresent communities, especially in an
urban area as dense as New York City. Instead, community districts will be viewed as
neighborhoods to achieve the same effects.
Each community district is approximately 1-2 square miles with populations
between 50,000 and 200,000 (NYCDCP 2008). Each of the five boroughs are divided
into multiple community districts: Brooklyn is divided into districts 1-18, Queens has
districts 1-14, Manhattan separates into districts 1-12, the Bronx also has districts 1-12,
and Staten Island has community districts 1-3. This totals 59 community districts. 3
The neighborhood characteristics collected from these community districts and
included in the data seta are % Russian foreign-born, % Italian foreign-born, % on public
assistance, population density, % female headed households with dependent children,
population change from 1990-2000, median income, % owner occupied housing, %
education of high school or higher, and % of those under 18. These variables were
chosen because they are commonly discussed in criminology and sociology as influential
on neighborhood public safety (Park and Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1969;
DeSena, 1994; Patillo, 1998; Bursik and Grasmik, 2001). They were available in the
community district profiles compiled by the New York City Department of City
Planning.

3

Community districts in New York City have been previously used in scholarly research (Golub, Johnson
and Dunlap 2006).
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The Percent of households on public assistance was chosen as a variable to measure
socio-economic status. Population Density was chosen as a variable because crime rises
with the number of people in an area; typically, the higher the density, the more crimes
will occur. The Percent of Female Headed Households with Dependent Children was
also chosen to be an indicator of low socio-economic status. Population Change from
1990-2000 was chosen because social disorganization theory suggests higher mobility
(moving in and out frequently) can lead to higher crime rates. Median Income was
obviously chosen as an indicator of socio-economic status. The Percent owner occupied
housing was chosen to indicate socio-economic status. The Percent Education of high
school or higher was also chosen as an indicator of socio-economic status. The Percent
of population under 18 was selected as people under the age of 18 are more susceptible to
becoming involved in criminal activity. The following variables were available in
percentages from the Census Bureau: Russian foreign-born, Italian foreign-born, public
assistance, owner occupied housing and high school or higher. The percent of femaleheaded households and the % of the population under 18 were calculated by the author.
Percent of female-headed households was calculated by dividing the number of female
headed households by the total number of households in the district. The percent of
people under the age of 18 was calculated by dividing the number of under 18 by the total
population of the district. Population density was also calculated by the author, and this
was done by dividing the total population of the district by the total number of square
miles in the district.
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Proxy Variables
Mafia presence is a difficult variable to measure; there is no list that keeps track of
Mafia members and associates, nor are members willing to come forward and label their
true means of employment on the Census, and there are no end-of-the-year financial
reports to request from them. Initially, the method of measuring Mafia presence was to
obtain the names and addresses of those Italian-Mafia members who were arrested under
the RICO Act, pinpoint their addresses on a map, and use the results as a measure of
Mafia presence. However, searching through court records became very expensive and
time-consuming, with few results. The addresses of those Mafia members arrested under
the RICO act were not easily accessible, so, the Mafia presence variable was constructed
as a dummy variable as a way to approximately measure Mafia presence. The
neighborhoods that are most popularly rumored to have dense Italian-American Mafia
presence were used to gauge Mafia presence. Suttles (1972) studied neighborhoods that
were rumored to have Mafia presence and this is where the idea stems from for this
study. The following neighborhoods that are rumored to have Mafia presence in New
York City were matched to their corresponding community districts: Howard Beach,
Queens can be found in Queens community district 10, Todt Hill, Staten Island matches
with Staten Island Community District 2; Princess Bay, Staten Island matches with Staten
Island community district 3; Bensonhurst, Brooklyn is in Brooklyn community district
11; Dyker Heights, Brooklyn is in Brooklyn community district 10; Arthur Avenue,
Bronx is found in the Bronx community district 6; Little Italy, Manhattan is in Manhattan
community district 2 (Sorrentino and Krase 2000). These neighborhoods were all labeled
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with a “1” and all other community districts were labeled as “0,” to achieve the proxy
variable for Mafia presence.
A problem with this approach is that a neighborhood’s reputations for a strong Mafia
presence may be based on old rumors and not represent its current status. Therefore, also
serving as proxy variables are the Percent Russian Foreign-born and the Percent Italian
Foreign-born as measures of organized crime presence. The Percent Russian Foreignborn was chosen to represent the growing populations of the Russian Mafia in Brooklyn
and other parts of New York City. The Percent Italian Foreign-born was chosen to
represent the Italian born immigrants in New York City and Brooklyn. The New York
City Mafia families only allow Italians to join as full members, so potential recruits are
most likely in areas with strong Italian reputations. Russian organized crime represents
the second-largest ethnic-based organized crime group in New York City, so it is useful
to include it as it can offer additional representation of social control through organized
crime (Finckenauer and Waring 1998).

Dependent Variables
Next, the street crime in New York City will be assessed. For the purpose of this
project street crime will be considered assaults, robberies and homicides as these seem to
be the offenses that people most often turn to in deciding if a neighborhood is safe. It is
recognized that some of these offenses, especially those involving intimate partners,
occur in homes or other indoor locations (Bursik and Grasmik 2001).
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Data from the New York City Police Department were retrieved for the years
1998 and 2001. The crime statistics chosen were assault, robbery, and homicide; these
crimes were chosen because they form a template for violent and public crimes.
According to social disorganization theory, a crime has to be somewhat public in order
for citizens to have social control over said crime; robbery is most often a crime that
occurs in public spaces. These numbers for each crime were averaged for the years 1998
and 2001, the aim is to account for year to year fluctuations in crime occurrences; this
was accomplished by adding the two years together and dividing by two times the
population from the year 2000. The crime rate was calculated by adding together the
total number of assaults, robberies and homicides divided by the total population and
multiplied by 100,000, this way the crime rate reflects units per 100,000. The crime
statistics were available by precincts in the five boroughs: Manhattan is home to 22
precincts, Brooklyn divides into 23 precincts, Queens 16 precincts, the Bronx has 12
precincts and Staten Island has 3 precincts; making a total of 76 New York City
precincts.
The issue of matching community districts and police precincts was easily solved
because previous research had called for the same procedure, and in the interest of saving
time it was easier to use the “ready-made” match devised by Golub, Johnson and Dunlap
(2006). They matched the community districts with police precincts during the same
time frame that we are assessing here. An illustration of the chart constructed by Golub
et al. is visible in Table 1.
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Methods
Once the data were collected, multivariate regression analyses were performed.
Initially, there was multicolinearity between the economic variables (VIF>4.0). These
included: % female headed households, % owner occupied housing, median income, %
education of high school or higher, and % of public assistance. Two of the variables
(female headed households, public assistance) have positive relationships to crime and
the other three variables (median income, high school education and home ownership)
have negative relationships. To rectify this, all of the aforementioned SES variables were
converted into Z scores, and then the variables median income, high school or higher and
home ownership were multiplied by -1. After this procedure, all of the SES variables
were combined to create an index called “Low SES2.” A test for multicollinearity was
run again using the new variable LowSES2 and all VIF scores were within a normal
range (VIF<4), indicating that the problem of multicollinearity had been fixed.
Finally, Ordinary Least Squares Regression models were estimated for the crime
statistics. Each model included a crime statistic variable as the dependent variable. The
first analysis was conducted for assault, followed by robbery, homicide and the total
crime rate (robbery, homicide and assault, units per 100,000), in that order. The
independent variables used for each model were the neighborhood characteristics: low
SES2, % Italian, population change, % under 18 and Mafia presence.
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Table 1
Community Districts and Precincts
NYPD Precincts Community Districts

Neighborhoods

1
5
6
7
9
13
14
17
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
26
28
30
32
33
34

1
3
2
3
4
6
5
6
4
8
7
11
7
11
9
10
9
10
12
12

Manhattan
Battery Park, Tribeca
Lower East Side, Chinatown
Greenwich Village, Soho
Lower East Side, Chinatown
Chelsea, Clinton
Stuyvesant Town, Turtle Bay
Midtown Business District
Stuyvesant Town, Turtle Bay
Chelsea, Clinton
Upper East Side
West Side, Upper West Side
Central Park
East Harlem
West Side, Upper West Side
East Harlem
Manhattanville, Hamilton Heights
Central Harlem
Manhattanville, Hamilton Heights
Central Harlem
Washington Heights, Inwood
Washington Heights, Inwood

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
52

1
2
3
9
4
10
5
12
6
11
8
7

The Bronx
Melrose, Mott Haven, Port Morris
Hunts Point, Longwood
Morrisania, Crotona Park East
Soundview, Parkchester
Highbridge, Concourse Village
Throgs Neck, Co-op City, Pelham Bay
University Heights, Fordham, Mt.Hope
Wakefield, Williamsbridge
East Tremont, Belmont
Pelham Parkway, Morris Park, Laconia
Riverdale, Kingsbridge, Marble Hill
Bedford Park, Norwood, Fordham

60
61
62
63
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

13
15
11
18
12
17
10
18
14
9
7
16

Brooklyn
Coney Island, Brighton Beach
Sheepshead Bay, Gerritsen Beach
Bensonhurst, Bath Beach
Canarsie, Flatlands
Borough Park, Ocean Parkway
East Flatbush, Rugby, Farragut
Bay Ridge, Dyker Heights
Canarsie, Flatlands
Flatbush, Midwood
Crown Heights South, Wingate
Sunset Park, Windsor Terrace
Brownsville, Ocean Hill

75

5

East New York, Starrett City
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76
77
78
79
81
83
84
88
90
94

6
8
6
3
3
4
2
2
1
1

Park Slope, Carroll Gardens
Crown Heights North
Park Slope, Carroll Gardens
Bedford Stuyvesant
Bedford Stuyvesant
Bushwick
Brooklyn Heights, Fort Greene
Brooklyn Heights, Fort Greene
Williamsburg, Greenpoint
Williamsburg, Greenpoint

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

14
14
9
12
5
13
10
8
2
7
4
11
6
12
1
3

Queens
The Rockaways, Broad Channel
The Rockaways, Broad Channel
Woodhaven, Richmond Hill
Jamaica, St. Albans, Hollis
Ridgewood, Glendale, Maspeth
Queens Village, Rosedale
Ozone Park, Howard Beach
Fresh Meadows, Briarwood
Sunnyside, Woodside
Flushing, Bay Terrace
Elmhurst, South Corona
Bayside, Douglaston, Little Neck
Forest Hills, Rego Park
Jamaica, St. Albans, Hollis
Astoria, Long Island City
Jackson heights, North Corona

120
122
123

1
2
3

Staten Island
Stapleton, Port Richmond
New Springville, South Beach
Tottenville, Woodrow, Great Kills
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

Four models were run to determine the effects of the Italian-American Mafia
presence on neighborhood public safety. Each model has an N of 59. The mean rate for
assault is 369.07 (SD= 255.10) indicating that on average, about 369 assaults occur per
100,000 residents in each community district in a given year. The mean rate for robbery
is 455.25 (SD=257.42), showing that the reported level of robberies are greater than that
for assaults. The mean rate for homicide is substantially less with 8.86 per 100,000
(SD=7.42). The crime rate has a mean of 821.54 (SD=487.48), so on average, about 822
crimes (assaults, homicides and robberies) occurred per 100,000 people in New York
City for the years 1998-2001. Percent Italian has a mean of 1.31 (SD=.73) and Percent
Russian has a mean of 1.25 (SD .71) indicating that on average each community district
has about 1% Russian and 1% Italian foreign-born. Table 2 shows the standard
deviations and the means for the neighborhood characteristics and the crime statistics for
New York City. Table 3 compares the crime statistics for rumored mafia neighborhoods
in New York City with the means of the crime statistics for all 59 community districts.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Neighborhood Characteristics and Crime Statistics in New York
City 1998-2001
Variable

Mean

Assault
Robbery
Homicide
Crime Rate
Percent Italian
Mafia Presence
Percent Russian
Percent Under 18
Density
LowSES2

Standard Deviation

369.07
455.68
8.86
821.54
1.31
.14
1.25
24.70
43519.12
.00

N

255.10
257.42
7.42
487.48
.72
.35
.71
7.61
25437.03
4.40

59
59
59
59
59
59
59
59
59
59

Table 3
Crime Statistics for Rumored Mafia Neighborhoods in New York City, 1998-2001.
Rumored
Community
Neighborhood District
Arthur Avenue
Howard Beach
Todt Hill
Princess Bay
Bensonhurst
Dyker Heights
Little Italy
All **

Bronx 6
Queens 10
Staten Island 2
Staten Island 3
Brooklyn 11
Brooklyn 10
Manhattan 2
All**

Percent
Italian
3.10
5.10
11.40
20.40
13.20
6.80
3.80
N/A

Assault
Rate*
623
211
117
38
193
150
194
369.07

*Rates are per 100,000 people
** Rates are the means for all 59 community districts
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Robbery Homicide Crime
Rate*
Rate*
Rate*
660
349
90
19
300
190
395
455.68

24
4
2
1
4
0
3
8.86

1307
564
209
58
497
340
592
821.54

Correlations
Table 4 shows several notable correlations between the variables. There is a
positive and significant correlation between LowSES2 and crime rate (r=.616). This
indicates that when there are more residents of lower socioeconomic status, a higher
crime rate is likely. Percent Russian has a significant and negative relationship with the
crime rate (r=-.251). This indicates that the higher percent Russian residents, the lower
the crime rate. The magnitude for this relationship is low but the primary hypothesis is
supported because the Russians have a sizeable organized crime group in New York City.
This result potentially indicates that the presence of their crime groups has negative
effects on the crime rate. There is a significant and negative correlation between percent
Italian and crime rate (r=-.378). Though the magnitude for this relationship is low, it
suggests the possibility that the higher the percent of Italian residents, the lower the crime
rate will be. This relationship does support the primary hypothesis of the thesis.
The proxy variable Mafia presence has a significant and negative correlation with
robbery (-.223), indicating that as Mafia presence in neighborhoods increases, robbery
decreases. This correlation supports the initial hypothesis that Mafia presence decreases
crime. Other significant correlations include percent Russian (r= -.251) and percent
Italian (r= -.391) which are both significantly and inversely correlated with robbery. This
suggests that the higher the percent of Russian or Italian residents, the lower the instances
of robbery. Notably, percent Italian is correlated at a higher magnitude than the percent
Russian. LowSES2, however, has the strongest correlation with robbery (r=.467).
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The significant variables most strongly correlated with assault were percent under
18 (r=.490) and LowSES2 (r=.699). Percent Russian (r= -.238) and percent Italian (.339) were also significantly correlated with assault, although negatively and at a lower
magnitude. This suggests the possibility that the percent Russian and percent Italian do
have an effect on the amount of reported assault.
Many of these correlations seem to support the hypothesis that Mafia presence has
a negative impact on crime. An OLS regression was performed to determine the stability
of these relationships with other variables controlled. Table 4 shows the zero-order
correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) for the independent and dependent variables.
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Table 4
Correlation Coefficients
Pearson’s r
X1

X2

X1

--

-.113

X2

-.113

X3

X3

X4

X5

X6

X7

X8

X9

X10

-.115

-.109

.795*

.-.064

.490

.179

.677

.332*

--

.215

-.118

-.164

.420*

-.238

-.203*

-.251

-.251*

-.115

.215

--

-.362*

-.339*

.452*

-.339*

-.391

-.316*

-.378*

X4

-.109

-.118

-.362*

--

.236*

-.028

.079

.144

.129

.146

X5

.795*

-.164

-.339*

.236*

--

-.120

.699*

.467*

.830*

.616*

X6

-.064

.420*

.452*

-.028

-.120

--

-.189

-.223*

-.181

-.210

X7

.490*

-.238*

-.339*

.079

.699*

-.189

--

.757

.828

.779

X8

.179

-.251*

-.391*

.144

.467*

-.223*

.757

--

.661

.796

X9

.677*

-.203

-.316*

.129

.830*

-.181

.828

.661

--

.464

X10

.332*

-.251*

-.378*

.146

.616*

-.210

.779

.796

.464

--

X1= Percent Under 18
X2= Percent Russian
X3= Percent Italian
X4= Density
X5= LowSES2

X6= Mafia Presence
X7= Assault
X8= Robbery
X9= Homicide
X10=Crime Rate

* indicates statistically significant, p<.05

34

Ordinary Least Squares Regression
Model 1 uses assault as the dependent variable. After conducting an ANOVA,
F=10.861 and is significant at p≤000. This indicates that model 1 is a good fit. In the
OLS model, two of the predictor variables were statistically significant, density and
LowSES2.

For density, the coefficient is B= -.002, significant at p≤.046, indicating a

negative relationship to assault. As population density increases by 1 unit, assaults will
decrease by .002. LowSES2 had a coefficient of B= 54.275 at the .000 significance level,
this indicates a positive relationship between low socioeconomic status and assault. As
LowSES2 increases by 54.275, assaults will also increase by one unit. The standardized
coefficient for LowSES2 is .945 and for population density beta= -.233 showing that
LowSES2 has a much stronger effect on assault. The regression for model 1 indicates
that the measures of organized crime do not have a significant relationship with assault.
Table 5 highlights the B coefficients and R2 for model 1.
In Model 2, homicide is the dependent variable. The ANOVA showed F=20.466
with a significance level of p≤ .000. This score shows that model 2 is also a good fit. In
the OLS model, the only variable considered significant is LowSES2 with coefficient B=
1.34 at a .000 significance level, indicating a positive relationship between low
socioeconomic status and homicide in New York City. As low socioeconomic status
increases, homicide also increases. This model indicates that low socioeconomic status is
the most influential factor on homicide in New York City. Again, none of the measures
for organized crime appeared significant (p<.05) in this model, indicating that organized
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crime does not have a strong relationship to homicide. See Table 5 for a detailed look at
the B coefficients and R2 for Model 2.
For model 3, the dependent variable is robbery. The ANOVA showed F=5.830
and the predictors were statistically significant at .000, indicating that the model is a good
fit. In the OLS model, two variables appeared as significant, LowSES2 and percent
under 18. LowSES2 has a coefficient B= 53.049 at a .000 significance level, this
indicates that LowSES2 has a direct relationship with robbery in New York City. As
LowSES2 increases by 53.049, robbery will also increase by one unit. Percent under 18
has a coefficient of B= -20.746 at a .004 significance level, indicating a negative
relationship between % under 18 and robbery in New York City. As the percent under 18
decreases, robbery will increase. The standardized coefficients (betas) are .916 for
LowSES2 and -.614 for percent under 18, this shows that LowSES2 has the greatest
impact on robbery. See Table 5 for highlights of the B coefficients and R2 for model 3.
Model 4 used Crime Rate as the dependent variable. The ANOVA shows F=
9.018 (p≤.000) indicating the model is a good fit. The coefficients that are significant are
LowSES2 (B=112.721, p≤.000) and percent under 18 (B= -34.630, p≤.006). LowSES2
has a positive relationship to the crime rate. As the crime rate increases by one unit,
LowSES2 increases by 112.721. The standardized coefficient for LowSES2 is larger
than 1 which usually indicates multicollinearity. When the offending variable (under 18)
was removed, there was no change in the results. The original results are kept, despite
the high standardized coefficient. The percent under 18 has a negative relationship with
the crime rate. As percent under 18 decreases by 34.630, the crime rate increases by one
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unit. The standardized coefficients indicate that LowSES2 (beta= .1.027) has the
strongest effect on the crime rate compared to the percent under 18 (beta= -.541). Again,
in this model, the proxy variables for Mafia presence are not statistically significant.
Table 5 shows the B coefficients and R2 for model 4.
Density is significant in model 1, percent under 18 is significant in models 3 and
4, and LowSES2 is significant in all 4 of the models. LowSES2 is the variable with the
strongest effect on the dependent variables in each of the models. Next we will look at
the possible reasons for the significance of these variables.

Table 5
OLS Regressions of Assault, Robbery, Homicide and Crime Rate in New York City
1998-2001, N=59
Variables

Unstandardized Coefficients (B)/Standardized Coefficients (Beta)
Model 1:

Model 2:

Model 3:

Model 4:

Assault**

Homicide**

Robbery**

Crime rate**

LowSES2

54.275* (.945)

1.374* (.823)

53.049* (.916)

112.721* (1.027)

Density

-.002* (-.233)

-2.470E-5 (-.085)

-.002 (-.437)

-.004 (-.223)

Percent Italian

-39.757 (-.133)

-.361(-.035)

-70.819 (-.136)

-94.587 (-.141)

Mafia presence

-.025 (.000)

-1.026 (-.048)

-4.358 (.006)

-9.133 (-.006)

Percent Russian

-43.734 (-.122)

-.528 (-.051)

-55.044 (-.126)

-94.150 (-.137)

Percent Under18

-10.515 (-.314)

.001 (.001)

-20.746* (-.614)

-34.630* (-.541)

.556

.703

.402

.510

255.10

7.42

257.42

487.48

2

R

Standard Error

* indicates variable is statistically significant, p<.05.
** indicates model is significant

parentheses indicate standardized coefficient (Beta)
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

Socio-economic status has long been a bench mark for high crime or lack of crime
(Park and Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1969; DeSena, 1994; Patillo, 1998; Bursik
and Grasmik 2001), and it is not surprising that this variable had strong and consistent
influence on the various crimes and crime rates in New York City. Consistently turning
up with a significance level of p<.000, low socioeconomic status was the most influential
predictor of assault, robbery, homicide and the overall crime rate.
Percent under 18 also has negative and significant effects on robbery and the
crime rate in New York City. This significance is not surprising because crime is
typically low in areas that have a large number of children. This does not support the
primary hypothesis of the thesis, but it does support the theory that social control keeps
neighborhoods safer. Families with children are more likely to personally insure that the
area they live in remains safe.
This significance of the negative correlation of percent Italian shown in Table 3 is
interesting and deserves a closer look. This does not necessarily have to mean that if
there are Italian immigrants in New York City they will be involved in crime or a threat
to any given neighborhood, but it does mean that there is a negative relationship between
foreign-born Italian-Americans in a particular area and the crime statistics chosen for this
project. As the percent foreign-born Italian increases, assault, robbery, homicide and
crime rate decrease. While it is not the most significant correlation compared to some
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other independent variables, it is interesting that a relationship exists. Now obviously,
this result does not indicate that Mafia presence has anything to do with neighborhood
public safety, because being born in Italy does not mean that you become involved with
the Mafia in the U.S. However, there is a high incidence of native-born Italians joining or
being indoctrinated into Mafia activities in the United States, and this is what makes this
result most intriguing.
The proxy variable Mafia presence had no significance relating to assault, robbery
homicide and crime rate in New York City. This could be because the variable does not
accurately measure Mafia presence; there is no easy way to measure the activity or
membership of the Mafia at the neighborhood level. Another reason for the difficulty in
assessing Mafia presence could be the strict enforcement of the RICO laws during the
1980s and 1990s. The many arrests of those involved in racketeering operations may
have changed the density of the Mafia presence in neighborhoods, perhaps there are less
Mafia members now and, therefore, the families have less influence on their historic
strongholds.
There are many weaknesses in this study. The crime statistics may not represent
actual crime because I did not use all of the reported crimes in New York City, and not
all crime is discovered or reported. Therefore, the actual crime rate may be significantly
higher in some communities. The neighborhood characteristics chosen may not represent
the communities in the appropriate way because what appears in the Census may not be
an accurate picture of what is going on in the community; especially since the Census is
not conducted annually. In urban areas like New York City, neighborhoods and

39

communities tend to change more rapidly than other types of cities. Community districts
are broader than neighborhoods and may include smaller areas that are homogenous with
respect to organized crime.
Although, there are many flaws in this study, it seems to be a good starting point
for future research. Further investigations on this topic should focus on obtaining a more
accurate measure of Mafia presence, either collecting addresses of those arrested under
the RICO act as initially planned or finding another more valid measure of Mafia
presence. In addition to this, it would be beneficial to see what happens if smaller
community units are analyzed, like zip code, area code or census tracts.
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CONCLUSION

The literature suggests that neighborhoods with organized criminal networks
would have lower crime rates than other neighborhoods or communities, because of the
social control their organization exerts on residents and visitors. The strictly organized
Italian-American Mafia seems to have characteristics that would translate throughout the
neighborhood: People will not participate in overt illegal behaviors because they do not
know who is watching, and the fear of what the Mafia might do keeps residents and
visitors to the neighborhood relatively well-behaved. Using crime statistics from the
NYPD and census data for neighborhood characteristics, four linear regressions were
calculated. The results indicate that low socioeconomic status is the main factor
explaining neighborhood crime rate variations in New York City. The percent of the
population under 18 and density were also listed as influential factors for some variables.
The percent of foreign-born Italians was noted as significant in the correlation models,
though it is not yet clear what this might truly indicate. The proxy variable for Mafia
presence was not significant, and this can either be due to inaccuracies of the
measurement of the variable or a true decrease in the influence of Mafia presence after
the string of RICO arrests in the 1980s and 1990s. The results imply that Mafia presence
does not influence neighborhood social control, but they do reinforce social
disorganization theory. The foundation of this theory is neighborhood stability; the more
unstable a neighborhood is, the more susceptible the neighborhood is to crime and
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dysfunction. Factors like low socioeconomic status and density influence neighborhood
stability. Future research should attempt to have more accurate representations of Mafia
presence and neighborhood characteristics.
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